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Lake Rotorua is experiencing increasing nutrient-related water quality 
problems. This paper is one in a series that explores the idea of creating a nutrient 
trading system as part of the ongoing policy response to this problem.
1 Most of 
the current nutrient flows to the Lake come from non-point rural sources – 
measuring these emissions is challenging. We find that it is possible to 
monitor/model nutrient loss from a wide range of activities in the Rotorua 
catchment. The model OVERSEER combined with ROTAN and some other 
models for forestry, urban and geothermal activities and horticulture already exist. 
They are currently in a process of enhancement – a particular area of current 
weakness is knowledge of the groundwater lags from specific locations in the 
catchment. The land-based models need to be used in a specific form that relies on 
initialisation with verifiable data and uses easily collated and verified data on an 
annual basis. The form of the model should be fixed for each regulatory year to 
minimise uncertainty for landowners and regulators. The models need to be 
updated to reflect new science. The process for doing this needs to be strategic and 
credible (this will be discussed in a later paper on governance processes). Once 
changes are recommended they need to be implemented in a way that is perceived 
to be fair.  
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iv 1 Introduction 
Lake Rotorua is experiencing increasing nutrient-related water quality 
problems. This paper is one in a series that explores the idea of creating a nutrient 
trading system as part of the ongoing policy response to this problem. Lock and 
Kerr (2008) provide an overview of the prototype design. In the nutrient trading 
system prototype, a trading cap is first defined. This defines the total controllable 
nutrient flows that will be allowed to reach the lake in each time period (Kerr et al 
(2007)). ‘Allowances’ summing to the total cap are issued (through gift or sale) to 
nutrient sources. Each nutrient source must then determine its annual nutrient loss 
and surrender sufficient allowances to match this loss. If they do not have enough 
allowances they must buy them from other sources who have more than they 
need. Strict compliance measures will be used to ensure that all nutrient loss is 
matched by allowances and hence that the environmental goal is achieved. The 
advantage of the trading system is that nutrient sources have much greater 
flexibility in how the environmental goals are achieved. Those who are able to 
reduce at low cost have an incentive to reveal this and all sources have incentives 
to innovate and adopt new nutrient reduction and mitigation ideas. This flexibility 
and these incentives should significantly lower costs as well as maintaining 
farmers’ control over their own land.  
Most of the current nutrient flows to the Lake come from non-point 
rural sources – measuring these emissions is challenging. Partly for this reason 
(though primarily for political ones), nearly all nutrient trading systems outside of 
New Zealand have focused on point sources which are comparatively easy to 
monitor and brought in agricultural sources through voluntary opt-in programmes 
(The World Resources Institute (2007)). These opt-in programmes have generated 
methods to estimate the effects on nutrient flows of specific mitigation options but 
they do not attempt to model farm scale water quality impacts for a large group of 
actors. The exception is a manure trading system in the Netherlands where manure 
application is used as a proxy for water quality impacts. A simple proxy like this 
cannot be used when dealing with New Zealand livestock production where 
animals are primarily grass fed or with heterogeneous nutrient sources. This paper 
1 focuses on ways to address the problem of determining nutrient flows for 
regulatory purposes. 
In a nutrient trading system we need to determine
2 net nutrient exports 
from each property to ensure that they are matched by the appropriate allowances 
for two reasons: first, to ensure that the cap is actually met and hence that the 
environmental goal is achieved; second, to make the system fair so that no one can 
benefit relative to others by non-compliance.
3 The approach used to determine 
allowance requirements needs to be seen to be consistent and effective. 
The problem of estimating nutrient loss is not unique to a nutrient 
trading system. Any system that effectively regulates nutrient loss at a farm level 
needs tools to estimate that loss. In a nutrient trading system, however, the 
determination of nutrient loss is regular and comprehensive and measured nutrient 
loss has direct financial implications for private actors. The tools are more visible 
and hence more likely to attract public criticism or legal challenge. Also, 
monitored nutrient loss is explicitly compared across properties that are allowed to 
trade; environmental advocates might challenge trades if the tools are not publicly 
accepted. In contrast, under other forms of regulation, regulators often deal with 
farms one by one in a less transparent way and there is less pressure to formalise 
and standardise tools.  
If trading is to have low transaction costs, and hence achieve the 
anticipated efficiency gains, compliance requirements must be certain; the model 
used must unambiguously determine the number of allowances required rather 
than being open to argument about the accuracy of any estimate. Because the 
model is explicitly used in compliance it must be based only on data that can be 
verified and audited if necessary. 
Non-point source nutrient export rates vary in space and time, and 
nutrients come from a large number of properties. This makes them difficult or 
even impossible to measure and costly to estimate accurately. In many situations 
                                                           
2 In this context ‘determine’ does not mean ‘measure’ which is impractical. It means using suitable 
proxies from which nutrient export can be calculated based on clearly defined regulatory rules. 
3 For discussion of the definition of ‘allowances’ for this market see Kerr et al (2007) 
2 we have no alternative but to monitor proxies for nutrient export (viz., measurable 
variables that determine nutrient export). We then ‘model’ nutrient exports using 
the proxies (e.g., productivity, stock numbers, fertiliser usage) as input variables 
for the model(s). The challenge is to use the ‘best’ model possible in the 
circumstances. 
This paper explores what ‘best’ model means for a trading system and 
describes the current technology for modelling so the reader can assess whether 
the current models are strong enough to support nutrient trading. Over time the 
models could be improved to increase the efficiency and equity of the system. The 
characteristics of a ‘good’ model are that it is: 
•  accurate: the model structure is well understood and 
scientifically credible and it is supported by the best current 
scientific information available;  
•  cheap to apply: it is based on relatively cheaply monitored 
inputs and is easy for landowners to use; and 
•  transparent: it is difficult to manipulate and perceived to be 
consistently applied. 
 Some of these may be in conflict with others and we need a framework 
in which to make tradeoffs between goals.  
This paper will begin by presenting the components of an ‘ideal’ model; 
what we would use if we had no scientific limitations and an infinite budget. This 
is presented to provide a benchmark for comparison. We then discuss the 
efficiency, equity and legal implications of real systems for determining nutrient 
flows and other emissions for regulatory purposes and give some examples from 
existing trading systems.  
The paper then describes the processes that need to be modelled and the 
current models available for the Lake Rotorua catchment. We discuss issues of 
monitoring and verification of basic property level data required as inputs to these 
models. We then explore how should we address aspects where there is significant 
3 scientific uncertainty and introduce issues relating to how to update the 
monitoring model as scientific information improves and as landowners demand 
the ability to monitor specific farming practices. We will also offer some thoughts 
on how to target research effort that directly aims to improve a nutrient trading 
system. 
2  Determining nutrient loss  
2.1  An ‘Ideal’ system for determining nutrient loss 
and real tradeoffs 
What we would really like to know is the impact of net exports from 
each property on net inputs to the lake in each time period. The timing of the 
impact depends on groundwater lags; because of local geology, water, and hence 
nutrients, can take between 0 and 200 years to reach the lake depending on where 
it falls. The size of the ultimate effect on water quality depends on off-farm 
attenuation; not all nutrients that leave the land will reach the lake. If we could 
measure inputs to the lake directly and accurately, landowners would be rewarded 
for every action they take that affects the lake in proportion to the benefit they 
create by their efforts. In economic terms, the effects on the lake would be 
‘internalised’.
4
The accuracy of the method used to determine nutrient loss has 
efficiency implications. The type of data reported to the regulator determines the 
land uses and practices that landowners can get credit or be penalised for changing 
and how much credit or penalty they get. Therefore, the model we use determines 
how well our effort to protect the lake is targeted. Accurate models (or responsive 
models that rapidly include new practices as they are discovered) also provide 
incentives over time to develop new nutrient reduction and mitigation practices 
and technologies whose real effects would be picked up by the model. Property 
owners will have financial incentives to adopt new practices and technologies 
                                                           
4 Tietenberg (1996), Tietenberg (2006) 
4 when they are available because they will lower their need for allowances and 
hence reduce their need to buy or enable them to sell allowances.
5
An accurate model may be perceived to be more equitable. Nutrient 
sources will need to surrender the same number of allowances if they have the 
same environmental impact.  
2.1.1  Why don’t we determine nutrient loss accurately? 
The first reason is simply that we can’t. We are unable to directly 
measure nutrient flows because they mostly pass through groundwater, and we 
don’t have scientific methodologies that can accurately estimate the implications 
of all actions at all times and in all places on lake water quality. Even if we did, 
we couldn’t possibly collect enough data to apply these methodologies over all 
actions at all times in the catchment. Even if we attempted to get as close to 
perfection as is currently scientifically possible, it would be extremely expensive 
and we could more usefully spend the resources on improving lake quality 
directly.  
Another reason to stop short of the highest level of accuracy we can 
achieve is that very complex models are non-transparent. Only a few people can 
understand them or verify the data that went into them. Thus it is hard to know if 
they are unbiased and applied consistently. This creates a risk of manipulation by 
a few unscrupulous players and makes the perception of inequity likely.  
We need to compromise and use simpler more user-friendly models that 
require relatively few data inputs for each source. This will lower compliance 
costs for those who need to use the model (both nutrient sources and regulators) 
particularly by reducing costs of verification and audit. We should however 
strategically simplify models to reduce costs and improve transparency while 
minimizing the sacrifice in accuracy and hence efficiency and equity.  
The exact form of the model we choose will change over time as 
technology develops, the value of nutrients changes and land use patterns and 
                                                           
5 Kerr and Newell (2003) give empirical evidence that firms’ adoption decisions respond to 
tradable permit markets.  
5 drivers change. New scientific knowledge and technology may allow us to 
achieve a higher level of accuracy with no additional compliance cost; if 
allowances have a very high value, the efficiency loss from inaccuracy will rise 
and the trade-off between the value of accuracy and the cost of compliance will 
shift toward a greater weight on accuracy; if some land uses and practices rise in 
importance in the catchment, the damage from inaccuracy in models of their water 
quality impacts will also rise simply because they will contribute a greater share 
of nutrient losses; further investment to improve the accuracy of determination of 
their nutrient losses will be justified.  
2.1.2  Quantifying pollutant discharges/emissions in other tradable 
permit markets 
The use of proxies and models for the ultimate resource or pollutant of 
concern is normal in tradable permit markets. The US Acid Rain market that 
controls sulphur dioxide emissions from US electricity generators is the closest to 
an exception because they can monitor emissions of SO2 directly and 
continuously. Even in this case however, the spatially variable impacts of the SO2 
are not taken into account so ‘hot-spots’ of pollution could occur (Ellerman et al 
(2000)). 
In other cases the link between the proxies and the actual pollutant is 
arguably closer than it is with nutrients. In the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
system fossil fuel emissions will be monitored at the point of extraction and 
import of fossil fuels.
6 This misses the timing of CO2 emissions and some 
subtleties of fuel use that affect emissions. Some fuel is wasted; it comes out as 
soot. Similarly a petrol tax, which has the same information requirements as a 
tradable permit market, is a blunt instrument that is sometimes used to address 
local air pollution.
7  
                                                           
6 Ministry for the Environment (2007) The framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme, September. Accessed at http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/files/emissions-trading-
scheme-complete.pdf on 16 January 2008. 
7 For modelling of the impacts of regulating petrol as a proxy for local air pollution see Fullerton 
and West (2002). For simulations of the effects of imperfect modelling of carbon sequestration in 
tropical forests on a potential avoided deforestation programme see Kerr et al (2005). 
6 Within New Zealand, the New Zealand Individual Transferable Quota 
system for fisheries management aims to ensure the sustainability of fisheries 
(Lock and Leslie (2007)). Authorities cannot however monitor the impacts of 
fishing activity on stock sustainability directly so they monitor tonnes of fish 
caught. Sustainability depends on the tonnes of fish caught each year but also 
depends on their age, specific location, timing of catch, techniques used etc. 
Supplementary regulations address some of these things but not all.  
The key difference between these systems and the modelling of nutrient 
loss is to do with perception. All of these systems use proxies for emissions and 
use models implicitly or explicitly to link those proxies to the environmental 
outcomes of concern. In each case, however, the participants in the system are 
regulated on the basis of something easily observable; fish, petrol, SO2. It would 
be possible to do this for nutrients from livestock production systems and monitor 
only animal numbers but at a significant loss in terms of accuracy because 
management is important. We have to consider the trade-off between participants’ 
perceived loss of certainty when we explicitly use a model in the monitoring 
process, and the increased flexibility and environmental certainty that a more 
complex model brings.  
The treatment of agricultural emissions within the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading System presents the closest parallel to nutrient trading. One 
option is to use the model OVERSEER based on data at the farm scale. Many of 
the issues we are discussing here arise in that context (Kerr and Sweet (2008)) – 
this is the subject of intense engagement and research in 2008. 
2.1.3  The legal status of modelling 
Legislation and/or regulations need to reflect the fact that the use of 
proxies and models for the ultimate issue of concern is the only efficient and 
equitable approach. Otherwise the rules for monitoring and modelling nutrient 
loss – and hence how many allowances must be surrendered to match it - can be 
challenged case by case on the basis that the model used does not accurately 
reflect true emissions. If this happened too often it would make the system 
unworkable and would create bias toward those who are able to challenge the 
system. It does not matter if the models are imperfect so long as the models are 
7 the ‘best’ available, we understand and accept limitations of the models, 
monitoring data etc. and the models are used consistently and transparently. 
Ideally, the participants in the trading system would be willing to accept 
the inaccuracies of the modelling system in exchange for the flexibility that an 
effective trading system offers. Then rather than challenging the system they can 
put their energy and resources that into trying to improve the models over time or 
simply into reducing nutrient flows. The issues within the New Zealand legal 
system are discussed in more detail in Rive et al (2008).  
Terminology 
‘Attenuation’ is the permanent removal from runoff, groundwater and/or stream 
flow of bioavailable N and P (viz., those that stimulate plant growth in the lake). 
Dissolved inorganic nutrients (DIN) (e.g., nitrate, phosphate) are readily taken up 
by plants. However, plant uptake does not represent permanent removal and is 
only temporary storage. At the end of the growing period, plants leach dissolved 
organic nutrient (DON) and die to form particulate organic nutrient or detritus 
(PON). Some bacteria and fungi derive energy by metabolising DON and PON. In 
the process they release DIN, which is then available to stimulate plant growth. P 
may become temporarily adsorbed onto sediment particles and/or form complexes 
with calcium, iron etc. These chemical processes are reversible and P may be 
released (e.g., from anoxic sediments in lake and stream beds).  
 
The term ‘nutrient cycle’ describes these uptake/release processes. Cycling is less 
than 100% efficient and each time nutrient goes around the cycle, some fraction is 
‘lost’ by being converted into non-available forms (viz., attenuated). Typically in 
large catchments (>100 km
2) the nutrient load measured at the catchment outlet is 
~50% of the sum of the loads into the system (e.g., from farms, point sources, rain 
etc). The other 50% is ‘lost’ or ‘attenuated’.  
 
For N the main mechanism of permanent removal is ‘denitrification’ (viz., 
conversion of nitrate to nitrogen gas). A small fraction of N in plant material (e.g., 
ligin) is mineralised so slowly that it can be considered permanently removed but 
it is difficult to estimate the fraction of plant material permanently removed. For 
P, permanent removal occurs principally through burial. 
 
‘Mitigation’ describes the things that landowners can do to increase permanent 
removal on-farm. For N this includes enhancing riparian wetlands to maximise 
denitrification. It also includes enhancing grass buffer strips and wetlands to 
maximise trapping of sediment and particulate nutrient. However, trapped 
particulates may release nutrients (mineralisation) unless denitrification occurs or 
plants are harvested. In contrast ‘nutrient reduction’ is any change in behaviour 
that reduces the nutrient loss in the first case by either reducing application or 
increasing efficiency in its use in harvested products. 
 
8 ‘Off-farm attenuation’ occurs after water (and hence nutrients) has left the farm 
but before it enters the lake, for example in large natural wetlands, streams, and 
aquifers. ‘Off-farm mitigation’ could include ‘treating’ stream flow (e.g., alum 
dosing as is being trialled in the Utuhina, diversion of spring and/or stream flow 
into natural or constructed wetlands) or groundwater treatment to remove 
nutrients.  
 
In our terminology ‘export’ = ‘on-farm nutrient  loss’ minus ‘on-farm 
attenuation’. 
3  Monitoring in practice  
3.1  Available models of nutrient exports 
To estimate net export from a property we need to model:  
1.  Nutrient generation and  
2.  on-farm attenuation.  
Two models currently used to estimate nutrient generation from 
pastoral farmland are: AgResearch’s model OVERSEER and the United States 
Department of Agriculture model CREAMS. For pasture and cropping land the 
HortResearch model SPASMO can be used. These models predict ‘edge of field’ 
nutrient losses (viz., nutrient fluxes leaving the root zone in drainage 
(OVERSEER, SPASMO) or at the bottom of the hill slope in surface flow 
(CREAMS)).  
Currently no single model estimates how much nutrient is permanently 
removed by on-farm mitigation measures such as riparian buffers, wetlands, 
ponds etc. This is the subject of ongoing research (e.g., NIWA is sub-contracted 
by AgResearch to develop nutrient attenuation modules for inclusion within the 
new version of OVERSEER). 
These models require input data. Some of the required data for a given 
property needs to be estimated only once (e.g., slope, soil type etc). Other 
information varies with time (e.g., stock type and number, fertiliser use, 
productivity etc). A sub-set of these data needs to be monitored – other data can 
be set to default values. The data inputs we monitor for the model that determines 
the N losses from a property defines what landowners can get credit or be 
penalised for changing.  
9 These models might not be used directly, in their current form, in the 
regulation. They might be too complex and involve too many variables. They 
could, however, be the basis of specific, simplified versions that would make up 
the ‘regulatory model’. They might also need to be supplemented by other models 
for reduction and mitigation options that are not currently included but that 
Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP), the Regional Council that has responsibility 
for water quality in Lake Rotorua, wants to include in the nutrient trading system. 
Here we focus on models relating to pastoral agriculture but these will need to be 
supplemented by models of forestry, urban emissions and horticulture. 
3.1.1 OVERSEER 
OVERSEER is a model developed by AgResearch that can be used to 
calculate annual average nutrient budgets for individual farms throughout New 
Zealand.
8 Its original aim was to help farmers optimise farm production. Almost 
coincidentally it calculates nutrient loss to the environment, and this aspect has 
made it attractive to regional councils.  
It can be operated in two modes – simple and detailed. The former 
considers the whole farm as a single unit, while the latter sub-divides the farm into 
blocks. The data inputs for OVERSEER are extensive and include: farm type 
(e.g., sheep/beef), productivity (e.g., t/y milk solids for dairy), soil type, soil 
drainage class, slope, rainfall, stocking rate, dry matter production, fertiliser use, 
supplementary feed, area for effluent irrigation, and in future will include the area 
and ‘condition factor’ of: wetlands, riparian buffers zones, and fenced and 
unfenced streams and which blocks they are found in. Changes in any of these 
inputs affect nutrient loss. 
Originally OVERSEER did not estimate how much nutrient is 
permanently removed by on-farm mitigation measures such as riparian buffers, 
wetlands, ponds etc. This led Environment Bay of Plenty to contract NIWA to 
develop the NPLAS model which is described below. Recently NIWA was sub-
contracted by AgResearch to develop nutrient attenuation modules (filter strips, 
                                                           
8 http://www.agresearch.co.nz/overseerweb/ 
10 natural and constructed wetlands) for inclusion within the new version of 
OVERSEER. 
OVERSEER calculates exports of both nitrogen and phosphorus. Soil 
erosion is the main delivery mechanism for P from land use although direct 
deposition of dung by stock in streams, bank and bed erosion by stock, and point 
source inputs (e.g., industrial discharges to streams and surface runoff from 
saturated effluent irrigation blocks) are also important.  
3.1.2 NPLAS 
NPLAS (Nitrogen and Phosphorus Loading Assessment System) is a 
model developed by NIWA for EBOP. It takes predictions from the OVERSEER 
and CREAMS models of N and P generation, and adds the effects of ‘on-farm 
mitigation’ (e.g., wetlands & riparian buffer strips). Again it is an annual average 
model. The data inputs for NPLAS are similar to those for OVERSEER. NPLAS 
is likely to be superseded by the updated OVERSEER. 
3.2  Modelling groundwater lags and attenuation 
To link net exports to lake inputs we need to quantify groundwater lags 
and off-farm attenuation. 
Because of groundwater lags, annual exports from different properties 
in a given year affect annual inputs to the lake in different years. For example in 
catchments where groundwater residence times are 15 and 70 years, exports this 
year will most strongly influence inputs in 15 and 70 years respectively. Because 
of ‘mixing’ within the aquifers, the annual export from a property will be ‘spread’ 
over several years and mingle with exports from earlier and later years.  
Natural off-farm attenuation in the Rotorua catchment (viz., in the 
aquifers and streams) is believed to be minimal. However, this has not been 
confirmed. The potential exists to undertake ‘off-farm mitigation’ (e.g., the 
current alum dosing trial in the Utuhina Stream and earlier P-sock trials at Lake 
Rerewhakaaitu) and this could be included in the nutrient trading scheme (see 
box). 
11 Crediting enhanced attenuation is a slightly unintuitive aspect of efficient 
monitoring and rewarding of changes in nutrient impacts. A landowner should 
need fewer lake-input-allowances to match nutrient exports if they will be 
attenuated en route to the lake, even if the attenuation occurs on someone else’s 
land.  
Suppose a wetland on property 2 will affect the inputs related to nutrient 
exports from property 1 (i.e. attenuate the exports) because the water flows 
through property 2’s wetland. We want to provide appropriate incentives for 
property 2 to create/enhance the wetland. Some of the benefits of the wetland will 
accrue directly to property 2 because its own exports will be associated with lower 
lake inputs and the owner will need fewer allowances for the same activities. 
Some of the benefits will flow to property 1, however, because property 1’s 
exports also will require fewer allowances. Requiring fewer allowances on 
property 1 is efficient because property 1’s exports now result in fewer lake inputs 
so are less damaging.  
One way for property 2 to capture more of the benefits of its investment is 
to negotiate with property 1 before creating/enhancing the wetland and get them 
to share part of the investment cost – perhaps in proportion to the nutrients that 
currently flow through it. Both properties receive a return on their investment 
through the trading system. 
 
3.2.1 ROTAN 
Quite a lot is known about the effectiveness of nutrient reduction and 
‘on farm’ mitigation systems. We know less about how quickly nutrient travels 
from a property to the lake, whether it follows surface pathways (viz., streams) or 
sub-surface pathways (viz., shallow or deep groundwater) and the amount of 
attenuation that occurs after nutrient has left the property (e.g., in streams, 
wetlands, groundwater or riparian zones). For effective regulation we need to 
estimate when nutrients will affect water quality and how this varies depending on 
groundwater lags and attenuation. 
Groundwater ‘lags’ are important at Rotorua and will need to be 
included in any nutrient-trading scheme. In the Lake Rotorua catchment, flows of 
nutrients through surface water that may have shorter lags are minimal. GNS-
Science has conducted groundwater investigations in the Rotorua catchment that 
includes measuring groundwater age (using ‘bomb’ tritium and other tracers) and 
12 detailed finite-element modelling to determine groundwater catchment boundaries 
(viz., which springs are connected to which properties).
9  
Results from a number of studies have been used to develop the 
ROTAN (ROtorua and TAupo  Nutrient) model. ROTAN is a daily time-step 
model that is being developed by NIWA in collaboration with GNS–Science and 
EBOP. It is being used to examine research questions including: the role of in-
stream attenuation, the potential for riparian wetlands to attenuate nutrients, the 
effects of storm flows and groundwater lags and impacts of land use change in 
general. ROTAN addresses issues including the spatial location of farms and 
changes over time in land use and hence nutrient loss. It can be used to estimate 
uncontrollable flows of nutrient through groundwater that results from past land 
use as well as predicting the timing and extent of impacts of current land use. The 
inputs to ROTAN include: daily rainfall and evapotranspiration time series, land 
use and vegetation cover maps at regular intervals of time (e.g., every 5 years), 
detailed catchment topography (from a digital elevation model so that slopes and 
catchment areas can be calculated), the stream network, and aquifer boundaries, 
volumes and residence times. The data on aquifer boundaries and the lag times 
associated with different parts of those aquifers is the subject of current GNS-
Science and NIWA research. 
3.3  Modifying and combining models to create a 
system for determining nutrient flows 
We propose that ROTAN, in a simplified form, could be linked to 
NPLAS, or OVERSEER and CREAMS, and SPASMO to create a modelling 
package that could be used to define inputs to the lake from each land parcel 
within a nutrient trading system. This would assist the design of a nutrient trading 
system by allowing us to simulate different design options to assess key tradeoffs 
empirically. If a trading system is adopted, this package, or a simplified version of 
it, could be used to determine net nutrient loss and lags between exports and 
inputs within the regulation. It would need to be usable by both nutrient sources 
and the regulator. 
                                                           
9 For reports on groundwater in this catchment see 
http://www.envbop.govt.nz/Water/Lakes/Technical-Reports.asp. 
13 For regulatory purposes, each property could be assumed to have one 
length of lag even though in reality there will be some distribution of lags. Kerr et 
al (2007) explains how this information can be incorporated in nutrient market 
design. As the groundwater lags increase, the uncertainty associated with them is 
also likely to increase. It may be sensible to define a period of time in which 
nutrients lost from the land are anticipated to reach the lake (of increasing range 
as the average lag increases) with properties in those zones rather than one 
specific year. 
For a nutrient trading system it would be possible to include ‘on farm’ 
attenuation but it might be sensible to exclude ‘off-farm attenuation’, at least 
initially because their impacts are still highly uncertain. If and when ‘in stream’ 
attenuation and other forms of ‘off-farm’ mitigation (e.g., alum dosing or stream 
diversion into wetlands) can be quantified satisfactorily at Rotorua, they could be 
included in the nutrient trading model.  
For non-land based activities such as sewage, storm water and 
geothermal activity, other existing models are needed to supplement the land-
based models.  
3.4  Monitoring and verification of model inputs.   
We must have agreed standards for monitoring and modelling: 
verifying, and if necessary auditing, the quality of the monitored data, and 
verifying the modelling results. Only OVERSEER data will vary across the 
nutrient sources – groundwater lags and geophysical characteristics of properties 
will not vary across time so can be reported and verified once only or determined 
directly by EBOP from external datasets such as cadastral, soil, slope and 
precipitation maps and ROTAN for groundwater lags. Verifying modelling results 
is simple; each property simply submits its OVERSEER model input files each 
year and EBOP staff can rerun the model. Verifying and auditing input data may 
be more complex.  
The variables that can be altered in OVERSEER can be divided into 
those that will be monitored annually for regulatory purposes and those that will 
have fixed (possibly farm-specific) default values after initialising the model with 
14 geophysical and fixed infrastructure (e.g. riparian boundaries and fenced 
wetlands) data for each farm. 
Initialising the model for each property requires some farm specific 
measurements and will be relatively time intensive. This is necessary only once 
however. The ‘benchmarking’ process for Rule 11, an existing regulation that 
caps nutrient loss from each farm, is essentially creating these data while also 
establishing an estimate of current nutrient loss or ‘benchmark’. It cannot be done 
by farmers alone – some external verification is required. If farmers want to use 
OVERSEER as a farm management tool, which they should in order to optimise 
their use of nutrient allowances, they may need assistance but use for compliance 
is simply a matter of data input. 
Farmers have an incentive to initially exaggerate the data that will 
change from year to year, for example fertiliser use and stock numbers, if free 
allocation of allowances is done on the basis of the ‘benchmarked’ data. This 
means these data must be carefully verified. If allocation of allowances and 
subsequent determination of nutrient losses are based on the same initialisation of 
fixed parameters however, any errors in the farm specific, non-changing data in 
the initialisation (e.g. soil type and slope) will have only second-order effects on 
farmers’ profitability. Hence there is a lower incentive to manipulate the data to 
provide high initial estimates of emissions. Initial exaggeration of nutrients could 
raise farmers’ free allocation of allowances but it will also increase the number of 
allowances they need to surrender. In contrast, if free allocation is based on 
something other than benchmarked values (as is proposed in Kerr (2008)), 
certification of the initialisation will be more important because farmers will have 
an incentive to initialise to values that imply lower nutrient loss.  
Once the model is initialised for each property, a number of variables 
will then be reported each year to generate actual nutrient loss numbers. 
OVERSEER allows a large number of such variable inputs including animal type 
and number, output, fertiliser application, supplementary feed and existence of a 
wetland. For regulation, only those that could be verified after the end of a year 
can be included easily. These will be those where financial records exist – for 
example purchase of fertiliser or supplements. Other values will have to have 
15 predetermined values, e.g. location of animals within the property during year. 
EBOP would randomly audit some nutrient sources’ reported data to deter 
cheating.  
EBOP and property owners might consider it worthwhile to include 
more complex nutrient reduction and mitigation options that require ongoing farm 
specific measurement or frequent data that cannot be verified at year end.  These 
would need to be associated with a more intensive enforcement process that may 
require real time certification of some data. For example the timing of fertiliser 
application is important for nutrient loss; this cannot be confirmed by ex-post 
audit if the farmer applies fertiliser, however if the fertiliser company applies the 
fertiliser and keeps records they can certify the location and timing of fertiliser 
application.  Data that cannot be verified ex post from paperwork might need to be 
reported more regularly and subject to random on-site inspections (of, for 
example, on which  block of the farm animals are located).   
Another way to improve the detection of non-compliance (i.e. reporting 
lower nutrient loss and surrendering fewer allowances than the model based on 
correct data would determine) is to make public the data files provided to EBOP. 
This way NGOs and others within the catchment can see each property’s data and 
say if they believe the data are misleading based on their own observations. For 
example if a farmer claims a riparian boundary, his neighbour may know that it 
was burned or removed (or never planted). If these data were to be made public, 
valid confidentiality concerns of property owners would need to be considered 
and farmers would need to be consulted. 
4 Uncertainty  and  updating/enhancing 
models  
Two issues arise here: adding new nutrient nutrient reduction and 
mitigation options; and updating the science of land use and management 
practices that are already included. 
16 4.1  Adding new nutrient reduction and mitigation 
options 
When the cost of compliance is relatively high, landowners and others 
will demand the ability to monitor specific farming practices or other nutrient 
reduction and mitigation options that are not currently included in our set of 
models.  
When considering whether to include options that are not in the model 
used to determine net nutrient loss we need to consider four key issues: 
1.  Scientific confidence in genuine reduction and the size of that reduction (and 
our ability to do new science to improve the reliability of the estimation); 
2.  our ability to collect data to verify a model that incorporates the new options 
(at reasonable cost); 
3.  the potential impact on nutrient loss across all properties; and 
4.  how much landowners or others will gain from their use (the value of 
reductions in terms of allowances net of the cost of achieving and 
reporting/verifying them summed over those who are likely to adopt). There is 
no point in incurring the cost of a more complex model if landowners will not 
take advantage of the new options and make considerable savings. 
 
Landowners have expressed concern that there may be very long lags 
between identification of a new option and its recognition/inclusion in the 
regulatory system. We could potentially add pastoral farming options that are not 
in OVERSEER or CREAMS if either the creators of OVERSEER and CREAMS 
are not intending to add those options, or if they are excluding them because they 
consider the uncertainty to be too high for their purposes. In the model used to 
determine nutrient loss for regulatory purposes, it may be preferable to include an 
option but attribute low nutrient loss implications rather than exclude it altogether 
– i.e. the regulatory standard of certainty may be lower than the scientific 
modelling standard. 
17 4.2  Updating science on nutrient loss from land use 
or mitigation options already included in model 
Although we propose basing the monitoring system on OVERSEER 
and other models, it would not be necessary to update the monitoring model each 
time the underlying models are updated. Updating on a schedule driven by 
outsiders may create unwanted uncertainty within the regulatory system. However 
there does need to be a process to update the regulatory system as science evolves 
both to protect the lake and ensure that we are doing so in the most efficient way 
possible. 
4.3 New  research 
New research will need to be funded. A governance body will need to 
determine research priorities and commission research. It will be possible to use 
research on related issues that is externally funded. For example the agricultural 
component of the New Zealand Emissions Trading System will require research to 
update OVERSEER that will be complementary to the needs of this system. 
Given that both systems may affect the same farmers, it would make sense to 
coordinate research programmes and also seek consistency between the models, 
and critically the exact form of required model input data, used for each system. 
4.4 Altering  allowance  requirements for compliance 
when models are updated 
When the model used to determine nutrient loss for regulatory purposes 
changes, properties and actions will be associated with different levels of nutrient 
loss. Will the ‘allowance requirements’ of landowners suddenly change with a 
new version of the model? Would this be efficient? Would it be fair? 
A principle that could apply when the regulatory tool is upgraded is: no 
retrospective penalties should apply. The purpose of upgrading the regulatory tool 
is to alter the incentives for changing land use and management. Retrospective 
changes that change the cost burden when landowner behaviour has not changed 
lead to landowner uncertainty with no compensating benefit.  
If the old tool is found to be systematically biased in terms of the 
environmental impact, this should be taken into account through an adjustment to 
18 the cap. This principle can be implemented by compensating nutrient sources for 
the impact of the model change on the allowances required to continue with 
current behaviour. 
Example 
In the following table (Table 1) the allowance requirement for each of the 
identical sheep/beef properties is estimated at 9kg per ha.  Forestry has the lowest 
possible nutrient loss and hence requires no allowances at the start of the 
programme. If the regulatory tool were unmodified, the calculation of change in 
allowances required for a change in land use from sheep and beef farming to 
forestry (the lowest possible nutrient loss) would be straightforward – a ‘reward’ 
of 9kg allowances per ha. 
Over time, however, the reward for a change from sheep/beef to 
forestry varies – through overestimation and then underestimation of nutrient loss 
from forestry by the tool. The reward is estimated at 9kg initially, then 5 (now 4kg 
are estimated from forestry) and 7 (2 from forestry) respectively for three time 
periods: phases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Table 1– Effect of changes to the regulatory model on allowances required for compliance 
Regulatory tool updated at commencement of each Phase 
    Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3   
   KgN/ha  KgN/ha  KgN/ha   
  Sheep/Beef 9  9  9   
  Forestry 0  4  2   
  'Reward' for change  9  5  7   
Taking the three identical sheep/beef farms and the variation in 
modelled nutrient loss from forestry (Table 1) we show what happens to the 
landowners. Compensation/recall is based on the land use in the period before the 
change in the regulatory model.  
Table 2 Allowance  requirements (AR), compensatory allowance allocations (CAA) and 
effects on net wealth of landowners as a result of the regulatory model changes 
















Use Effect  on 
landowner 
               
A  0   F  4  4   F  0  -2  2   F  0 
B  9   S/B  0  4   F  0  -2  2   F  0 
C  9   S/B  0  9   S/B  0  0  2   F  0 
Conversion 
Incentive  
9  5     7   
F=forest; S/B = sheep/beef 
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In phase 1 only property A converts to forestry. The conversion 
incentive is the difference between the allowance requirement in sheep/beef and 
that in forestry.  
At the beginning of phase 2 the model changes. Property A faces a 4 
unit higher allowance requirement for its existing land use and is compensated by 
being given 4 allowances per ha so they are not disadvantaged. Neither property B 
nor C is affected by the change based on their previous use so they are not 
compensated. They face a new efficient, conversion incentive of 5 and property B 
chooses to convert.   
At the beginning of phase 3 the regulatory model changes to a lower 
nutrient loss for forestry. Property B and C now face lower allowance 
requirements for their existing use so to avoid windfall gains they are required to 
give up 2 allowances per ha. The incentive to convert to forestry is now 7, which 
is again efficient based on current knowledge.  
This approach makes the incentives to change land use and 
management as accurate as possible at all points in time and minimises the risk 
landowners face. The only agents who face risk associated with the change in the 
regulatory tool are those who were planning to change land use before the tool 
adjustment and then find that the rewards have changed. 
To maintain alignment between the cap and the environmental goal, the 
total cap needs to be reduced between phase 1 and 2 (and increased between phase 
2 and 3). The reduction in cap required to keep the goal consistent for all vintages 
(for definition and discussion of vintages see Kerr et al (2007)) is the change in 
modelled nutrient loss from forestry times the area in forestry. This will also need 
to compensate for all historical emissions – this may lead to a reassessment of the 
environmental goal. Options for how to reduce the cap are discussed in a paper on 
cost sharing (Kerr (2008)). 
20 5 Summary   
It is possible to monitor/model nutrient loss from a wide range of 
activities in the Rotorua catchment. The models OVERSEER and CREAMS 
combined with ROTAN and some other models for forestry, urban and 
geothermal activities and horticulture (SPASMO) already exist. They are 
currently in a process of enhancement – a particular area of current weakness is 
knowledge of the groundwater lags from specific locations in the catchment.  
The land based models need to be used in a specific form that relies on 
initialisation with verifiable data and uses easily collated and verified data on an 
annual basis. The form of the model should be fixed for each regulatory year to 
minimise uncertainty for landowners and regulators. 
The models need to be updated to reflect new science. The process for 
doing this needs to be strategic and credible (this will be discussed in a later paper 
on governance processes). Once changes are recommended they need to be 
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